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DISROBING JUDICIAL CAMPAIGN
CONTRIBUTIONS: A CASE FOR USING THE
BUCKLEY FRAMEWORK TO ANALYZE THE
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF JUDICIAL
SOLICITATION BANS
AIMEE PRIYA GHOSH*
In the past twenty years, numerous elected judges (and judicial candidates)
have argued that state regulations prohibiting them from personally soliciting
campaign contributions—even from would be litigants—violate their First
Amendment free speech rights and should be struck down.
The constitutionality of these bans hedges on the level of scrutiny used for
review. The bans should not be subject to strict scrutiny, but rather, the less
rigorous campaign finance framework set out by the Supreme Court in Buckley v.
Valeo. If the Buckley framework is employed, the constitutionality of these bans
will likely be upheld, and they will continue to serve as an important safeguard of
the impartiality and independence of the American judicial system.
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INTRODUCTION
There is no debate that the hallmark characteristics of the American
judicial system should be impartiality and independence. Former Supreme
Court Justice Sandra Day O’Connor summed up this sentiment in a 2010
New York Times column, noting that “[i]n our system, the judiciary, unlike
the legislative and the executive branches, is supposed to answer only to
the law and the Constitution. Courts are supposed to be the one safe place
where every citizen can receive a fair hearing.”1 In fact, the United States
Supreme Court has made clear that litigants have a constitutional right to
try their case before “a neutral and detached judge.”2
Regardless, the independence of the judiciary has been increasingly
1. Sandra Day O’Connor, Editorial, Take Justice off the Ballot, N.Y. TIMES, May 23,
2010, at WK9.
2. Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 62 (1972).
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threatened over the last decade by two factors: (1) a dramatic rise in
spending in state judicial elections and (2) a systematic weakening of
restrictions on the conduct of elected judges and judicial candidates.3
These trends pose both real and perceived risks to the impartiality and
independence of the American judicial system.4
These risks are demonstrated by the 2010 retention elections5 of three
Iowa Supreme Court justices. In April 2009, the Iowa Supreme Court
struck down a ban on same-sex marriage, allowing same-sex couples to
wed in the state.6 By the 2010 election season, the three Iowa Supreme
Court justices seeking reelection in retention elections were targets of an
organized effort, paid for mostly by national and out-of-state groups
opposed to gay marriage, to oust the justices because of the controversial
marriage decision.7 The three justices did not raise money to respond to
the campaign against them.8 Unsurprisingly, on November 2, 2010, these
justices, for the first time in Iowa’s history, lost their retention elections
and their seats on the court.9
The circumstances of this judicial election were not unique to Iowa
during the 2010 election cycle. The ugly campaign against the Iowa
Supreme Court justices was replayed in states across the country against
judges whose opinions on controversial issues upset specific interest
groups.10 The trend of judges being “penalized for a single vote” leads to
an obvious question: will elected judges “start looking over their shoulders

3. See MARK KOZLOWSKI & PRAVEEN KRISHNA, FREEING CANDIDATE SPEECH IN
JUDICIAL ELECTIONS: OR, HOW SAFE ARE LOOSE CANONS? 3 (2002) (arguing that an influx
of campaign contributions and a series of court decisions striking down restrictions on
judicial candidate speech have hurt efforts to maintain the integrity of judicial elections).
4. See infra notes 10–14 and accompanying text (highlighting examples of the
negative effects of increased campaign spending and weakened judicial campaign
restrictions, which include volatile judicial campaigns and judges who vote
disproportionally in favor of campaign contributors).
5. In a judicial retention election, a sitting judge does not face an opponent; rather,
voters decide whether the judge should remain on the bench for another term. Judicial
Retention Elections, IOWA JUDICIAL BRANCH, http://www.iowacourtsonline.org/
Public_Information/About_Judges/Retention/ (last visited Sept. 19, 2011).
6. Monica Davey, Gay Couples in Iowa Win Right to Wed, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 4, 2009,
at A1.
7. John Gramlich, Will Gay Marriage Decision Cost Iowa Justices Their Jobs?,
STATELINE, Sept. 10, 2010, http://www.stateline.org/live/details/story?contentId=511967;
A.G. Sulzberger, In Iowa, Voters Oust Judges Over Marriage Issue, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3,
2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/03/us/politics/03judges.html.
8. Sulzberger, supra note 7.
9. Id.
10. See id. (“Though the Iowa election was the most prominent, similar ouster
campaigns were begun in other states against state supreme court justices running
unopposed in retention elections—judges whose rulings on matters involving abortion,
taxes, tort reform and health care had upset conservatives.”).
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when they tackle controversial cases?”11
Media reports suggest that the answer to this question is “yes.” A New
York Times investigation of the Ohio Supreme Court, for example,
discovered that the state’s high court justices habitually ruled on cases in
which parties to the case or groups filing supporting briefs were campaign
contributors.12 On average, the justices voted in favor of contributors
seventy percent of the time, and one justice, in particular, voted for his
contributors ninety-one percent of the time.13 To add insult to injury, this
connection between judicial campaign contributors and decision-making
votes in their favor has eroded public confidence in the judicial system.14
Rules for judges and judicial candidates intended to preserve the
impartiality and independence of the judiciary are one safeguard against the
improper influences associated with campaigns.15 Forty-nine out of fifty
states have adopted rules governing the conduct of judges that are based on
the American Bar Association’s (ABA’s) Model Code of Judicial Conduct
(“Model Code”).16 The Model Code establishes standards for the ethical
conduct of judges and judicial candidates.17 It not only regulates the
conduct of these individuals, but it also regulates speech.18 Provisions of
the Model Code, as adopted by states, have come under fire in recent years
after the Supreme Court struck down part of Minnesota’s Code of Judicial
Conduct because it violated the First Amendment’s guarantee of free
speech.19

11. Eliza Newlin Carney, The Perils of Big Money in Judicial Elections, NAT’L J. (Dec.
16, 2010, 9:46 AM), http://www.nationaljournal.com/columns/rules-of-the-game/the-perilsof-big-money-in-judicial-elections-20101004?mrefid=site_search (internal quotation marks
omitted).
12. Adam Liptak & Janet Roberts, Campaign Cash Mirrors a High Court’s Rulings,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 2006, at A1.
13. Id.
14. See ADAM SKAGGS, BUYING JUSTICE: THE IMPACT OF CITIZENS UNITED ON JUDICIAL
ELECTIONS 4–7 (2010) (compiling the results of nine polls demonstrating that the public at
large and judicial campaign contributors believe that campaign spending influences judicial
decision making). The report included the results of a 2001 national poll by Greenberg
Quinlan Rosner, which found that seventy-six percent of respondents believe that
contributions influence a judge’s decisions. Id. at 5.
15. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT pmbl. (2004) (explaining that the Model
Code was designed to protect public trust in the judiciary and legal system).
16. Brent Dorner, Comment, 2007 Model Code of Judicial Conduct: Are the Speech
Restrictions Necessary?, 33 J. LEGAL PROF. 341, 341 (2009) (citing JAMES J. ALFINI ET. AL.,
JUDICIAL CONDUCT AND ETHICS 1–5 (2007)).
17. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT pmbl. (2007) (declaring that the Model
Code was promulgated to maintain “[a]n independent, fair and impartial judiciary”).
18. See, e.g., MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 4.1(A)(2)–(3) (2011) (prohibiting
a judge or judicial candidate from “mak[ing] speeches on behalf of a political organization”
or “publicly endors[ing] or oppos[ing] a candidate for any public office”).
19. See Republican Party of Minn. v. White (White I), 536 U.S. 765, 787–88 (2002)
(striking down Minnesota’s “announce clause,” which prohibited judicial candidates from
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One provision of the Model Code, a solicitation ban, prohibits judges
and judicial candidates from “personally solicit[ing] or accept[ing]
campaign contributions other than through a campaign committee.”20 The
purpose of the solicitation ban is to address the risks posed by judicial
campaign contributions on the independence and impartiality of the
judiciary.21 Like other Model Code provisions dealing with political
activities, the solicitation ban has been challenged on the grounds that it
violates the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment.22 To date, the
Supreme Court has not issued an opinion on the constitutionality of state
solicitation bans for judges and judicial candidates.
This Comment argues that courts should not assess the constitutionality
of state judicial solicitation bans by using strict scrutiny, but rather, that
they should employ the less exacting framework of analysis set forth by the
Supreme Court in Buckley v. Valeo.23 Furthermore, this Comment reasons
that if the Buckley framework is employed, judicial solicitation bans will be
upheld against First Amendment challenges. Part I of this Comment
describes the prevalence of state judicial elections as well as the history of
First Amendment challenges to state solicitation bans, concluding with a
description on the extant law on the First Amendment and campaign
finance regulations.24 Part II sets forth the arguments against using strict
scrutiny to analyze the constitutionality of judicial solicitation bans,25 and
Part III contends that the proper level of judicial scrutiny for solicitation
bans is the Buckley framework.26 Furthermore, Part III argues that if the
Buckley framework is used, then state solicitation bans will likely be
upheld against First Amendment challenges.27 Part IV of this Comment
discusses whether solicitation bans are enough to guard the integrity of the
American judicial system.28
announcing their views on disputed legal or political issues).
20. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 4.1(A)(8) (2011).
21. See Alexandrea Haskell Young, Note, The First Chink in the Armor? The
Constitutionality of State Laws Burdening Judicial Candidates After Republican Party of
Minnesota v. White, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 433, 472–73 (2004) (“As the reporter to the Model
Code wrote, ‘[t]he problem of funding a campaign for judicial office probably presents the
greatest of all conflicts between political necessity and judicial impartiality.’” (quoting E.
WAYNE THODE, REPORTER’S NOTES TO CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT 98 (1973))).
22. See, e.g., Stretton v. Disciplinary Bd., 944 F.2d 137, 139 (3d Cir. 1991)
(concerning, in part, a First Amendment challenge brought by a judicial candidate to
provisions of Pennsylvania’s Code of Judicial Conduct that prohibited judicial candidates
from personally soliciting campaign funds).
23. 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
24. See infra Part I.
25. See infra Part II.
26. See infra Part III.A–B.
27. See infra Part III.C.
28. See infra Part IV.
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I.

BACKGROUND

A. The Landscape of State Judicial Elections
In the United States, the election of state judges is very much the rule,
and the appointment of judges, the exception. Thirty-nine out of fifty states
use elections to select or retain some or all of the state’s judges.29 The
large majority of all state judges either run in elections to join the bench, or
in retention elections to keep their seat.30
State judicial elections are not only common, they are also expensive.
Nationally, between 2000 and 2009, state supreme court candidates raised
$206.9 million, a figure more than double the $83.3 million raised between
1990 and 1999.31 Of the money raised during the last decade, $62,589,165
came from business interests and $59,272,198 came from lawyers and
lobbyists.32 These interests represent “repeat players in high-stakes
litigation,” and therefore are motivated to support judges who favor their
cause.33 Contributions from these two sectors alone accounted for well
over half of all judicial campaign contributions between 2000 and 2009.34
Stories of judges favoring major campaign contributors have been
widely publicized in the media. For example, in 2009, the New York Times
and other popular media outlets ran a series of stories about an egregious
case of judicial impropriety concerning a West Virginia Supreme Court
justice, Brent Benjamin, who voted in favor of the company of a coalmining executive, Don Blankenship,35 after Blankenship contributed
29. See Methods of Judicial Selection, AM. JUDICATURE SOC’Y, http://www.judicial
selection.us/judicial_selection/methods/selection_of_judges.cfm?state= (last visited Sept.
19, 2011) (compiling the methods of selecting judges in all fifty states); see also MD.
CONST. art. IV, §§ 3, 5, 5A(c)–(e) (describing the state requirements for judicial general and
retention elections); NEV. CONST. art. VI, §§ 3, 5 (calling for the election of state supreme
court, appellate court, and district court judges); TENN. CONST. art. VI, §§ 3–4 (mandating
that all state supreme court and inferior court judges be elected by qualified voters of the
state).
30. See Judicial Selection and Retention FAQs, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS,
http://www.ncsc.org/topics/judicial-officers/judicial-selection-and-retention/faq.aspx# (last
visited September 19, 2011) (explaining that nationwide, 1084 out of 1243 state appellate
judges, or eighty-seven percent, face some type of election, and that 7378 out of 8489 state
trial court judges, or eighty-seven percent, face some type of election).
31. JAMES SAMPLE ET AL., THE NEW POLITICS OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS 2000–2009, at 8
(2010). To put this spending growth in perspective, the Consumer Price Index increased
twenty-five percent between 2000 and 2009. Id.
32. Id.
33. SKAGGS, supra note 14, at 2.
34. See SAMPLE ET AL., supra note 31, at 8 fig. 3.
35. See, e.g., Adam Liptak, Case May Alter the Election of Judges, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
15, 2009, at A29 (discussing the financial relationship between Benjamin and Blankenship,
which ultimately ended in a United States Supreme Court case, Caperton v. A.T. Massey
Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252 (2009), over whether Benjamin should have recused himself from
Blankenship’s case); Barry Meier, In Long-Running Coal Battle, a New Round in Virginia,
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roughly $3 million to Benjamin’s election campaign.36 But this publicity
was hardly a new phenomenon—the concern that judges are influenced by
campaign contributions has been addressed by mainstream media outlets
for decades.37 The topic has been further publicized, and probably
sensationalized, by fictional works like John Grisham’s The Appeal.38
Thanks in part to media attention on the subject, a hidden cost of
escalating spending in judicial elections is the erosion of public confidence
in the fairness of the judicial system. A February 2009 USA Today/Gallup
poll found that eighty-nine percent of respondents believed that the
influence of campaign contributions on the decisions of judges was
problematic.39 Similarly, a 2009 Harris Interactive national poll found that
eighty percent of Americans believed that judges should not hear cases
involving campaign contributors.40 Approximately a dozen similar polls
have been conducted in recent years, showing trepidation among members
of the public concerning the effect of campaign spending on the integrity of
the judicial system.41
B. The Personal Solicitation Ban on State Judges and Judicial
Candidates
Regulations on judicial solicitations of campaign funds first appeared in
the ABA’s 1972 Code of Judicial Conduct, which provided that a judicial
candidate “should not himself solicit or accept campaign funds,” but could
form committees to solicit on his behalf.42 In 1990, the ABA amended the

N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 2010, at B3 (chronicling the legal battles of Hugh Caperton,
Blankenship’s legal opponent whose company was damaged by the court decision in which
Benjamin cast a deciding vote in favor of Blankenship); Editorial, Justice for Sale?, WASH.
POST, Mar. 3, 2009, at A12 (arguing that electing judges is an unpalatable option in light of
the case involving Blankenship, Benjamin, and Caperton).
36. Liptak, supra note 35, at A29.
37. See, e.g., Richard Woodbury, Is Texas Justice for Sale?, TIME, Jan. 11, 1988,
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,966426,00.html
(describing
how
attorneys in a case before the Texas Supreme Court systematically doled out campaign
contributions to the justices); Frontline: Justice for Sale (PBS television broadcast Nov. 23,
1999) (investigating judicial campaign contributors and how the contributors are “repaid”
by the judges they help elect).
38. See Janet Maslin, If You Can’t Win the Case, Buy an Election and Get Your Own
Judge, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/28/books/
28maslin.html (describing the plot of John Grisham’s novel, The Appeal, in which a big
company spends money to elect state supreme court justices to win a favorable judgment in
a pending case).
39. SKAGGS, supra note 14, at 4.
40. Id.
41. See, e.g., id. at 5–7 (compiling polling data suggesting that a majority of Americans
believe that judges are influenced by campaign contributions).
42. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 7(B)(2) (1972).
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1972 Code and created the Model Code of Judicial Conduct.43 The
solicitation ban remained substantially the same between the two versions,
save a change transforming the rule from an aspirational rule to a
mandatory one.44 The most recent version of the Model Code45 retains the
solicitation ban and makes no substantial changes to this particular
provision.46
The Model Code does not take legal effect until it is adopted by state
statute or by judicial order.47 Forty-nine states have adopted a variation of
either the 1972 Code or 1990 Model Code.48 Thirty-two states have
enacted judicial codes of conduct that prohibit or restrict judges and
judicial candidates from personally soliciting campaign contributions.49
To assist states with enforcement of the Model Code, the ABA
promulgated the Model Rules for Judicial Disciplinary Enforcement.50
These rules describe the grounds for judicial discipline, which include
violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct and willful violations of state
high court orders.51 Thus, in states that have adopted a solicitation ban, a
43. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (1990).
44. Compare CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 7(B)(2) (1972) (providing that a
judicial candidate “should not himself solicit or accept campaign funds,” but can form
committees to solicit on his behalf), with MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon
5(C)(2) (1990) (providing that a judicial candidate “shall not personally solicit or accept
campaign contributions . . . [but may] establish committees . . . to conduct campaigns for the
candidate”).
45. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (2011).
46. Compare MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5(C)(2) (1990) (providing that
a judicial candidate “shall not personally solicit or accept campaign contributions . . . [but
may] establish committees . . . to conduct campaigns for the candidate”), with MODEL CODE
OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 4.1(A)(8) (2011) (providing that a judicial candidate may not
“personally solicit or accept campaign contributions other than through a campaign
committee”).
47. Dorner, supra note 16, at 342.
48. Id. Additionally, Montana has not adopted a version of the ABA guidelines, but has
established its own judicial code of conduct. Id. at n.13.
49. See Methods of Judicial Selection, supra note 29 (showing that Alaska, Arizona,
Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky,
Louisiana, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, New York, North
Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee, Utah,
Vermont, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming have adopted by statute or
judicial canon a form of solicitation ban).
50. MODEL RULES FOR JUDICIAL DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT (1994).
51. Id. R. 6. The Model Rules prescribe judicial disciplinary proceedings that begin
with a complaint filed with the state’s judicial disciplinary board. Id. R. 17. The
proceedings include an investigation and discovery phase, culminating in a hearing; the state
judicial disciplinary board then issues its findings and recommendations. Id. RR. 22, 24.
The Model Rules provide that all public sanctions on a member of the judiciary should
come from the state high court. Id. R. 25. However, jurisdictions may permit the
disciplinary board to impose some disciplinary measures. Id. cmt. The Model Code also
provides that a complaint against a member of the state’s highest court should be
adjudicated in much the same way as any other complaint except that a special supreme
court should be formed to review the matter. Id. R. 26.
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violation of the ban would suffice as grounds for judicial discipline.52
The methods of enforcing judicial codes of conduct, like the solicitation
ban, are typically found in state statutes and constitutions.53 Violations of
the judicial code of conduct must be proven by “clear and convincing
evidence” before a sanction may be imposed.54 Once it is determined that a
judge or judicial candidate engaged in misconduct, the court with
jurisdiction over the individual bears responsibility for determining the
appropriate sanction.55 As such, disciplinary measures vary by jurisdiction
and by the circumstances of judicial misconduct, but may include
removal,56 suspension,57 censure,58 limitations on the performance of
judicial duties, fines, or any combination of these sanctions.59
C. The First Amendment and Campaign Finance Rules
1.

Overview of free speech jurisprudence
The Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment provides that
“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.”60 The
Supreme Court has held that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth

52. See id. R. 6 (outlining the grounds for judicial discipline, which include violations
of the code of judicial conduct and valid orders of the highest court of the jurisdiction).
53. See, e.g., In re Hapner, 718 So. 2d 785, 787–88 (Fla. 1998) (per curiam) (holding
that the state’s constitution provides the state’s judicial disciplinary commission with
jurisdiction over allegations of judicial misconduct and affirming the commission’s finding
that the judge in question violated canons of the state’s code of judicial conduct).
54. See, e.g., In re Drury, 602 N.E.2d 1000, 1002 (Ind. 1992) (per curiam) (noting that
the state judicial disciplinary commission has the burden of proving judicial misconduct by
clear and convincing evidence).
55. See, e.g., Spruance v. Comm’n on Judicial Qualifications, 532 P.2d 1209, 1212
(Cal. 1975) (en banc) (per curiam) (noting that, as the appellate court of the jurisdiction, the
court must make the “ultimate, dispositive decision” on how to sanction the judge before the
court).
56. See, e.g., id. at 1211 (holding that a judge’s “wilful misconduct in office” and
“conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice that brings the judicial office into
disrepute” warranted removal from office (internal quotation marks omitted)).
57. See, e.g., Disciplinary Counsel v. Parker, 876 N.E.2d 556, 560, 574 (Ohio 2007)
(per curiam) (suspending a judge for eighteen months as punishment for twenty-three
violations of eight judicial canons and eight violations of three disciplinary rules),
reinstatement granted, 907 N.E.2d 726 (Ohio 2009).
58. See, e.g., In re Allen, 998 So. 2d 557, 564–65 (Fla. 2008) (per curiam) (concluding
that since a judge violated three provisions of the state’s code of judicial conduct, the state’s
judicial disciplinary commission’s recommendation that the judge be publicly reprimanded
was correct).
59. See, e.g., Drury, 602 N.E.2d at 1009 (“Upon a finding of judicial misconduct, the
Court may impose any of the following professional disciplinary actions: removal,
retirement, suspension, discipline as an attorney, limitations or conditions on the
performance of judicial duties, reprimand or censure, fine, assessment of costs and
expenses, or any combination of the above sanctions.”).
60. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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Amendment61 incorporates the Free Speech Clause and that the Clause
applies to the states.62 The Free Speech Clause protects every citizen’s
ability to express himself or herself without government suppression.63 A
citizen’s right to free speech is broad, but it is not absolute and may be
restricted in some circumstances.64
Speech restrictions come in two forms: content-based restrictions and
content-neutral restrictions.65 A content-based restriction is enacted
because of “hostility—or favoritism—towards the underlying message
expressed” by the regulated speech, while a content-neutral restriction
poses “no significant danger of idea or viewpoint discrimination.”66
Examples of content-based restrictions include laws banning the hiring of
teachers who promote the overthrow of the government by force or banning
the display of swastikas.67 In contrast, examples of content-neutral
restrictions include bans on billboards in residential neighborhoods or
prohibitions on loud demonstrations near a hospital.68
To distinguish content-based restrictions from content-neutral ones, “the
‘principal inquiry . . . is whether the government has adopted a regulation
of speech because of [agreement or] disagreement with the message it
conveys.’”69 When considering a speech restriction, if the answer to this
inquiry is “yes,” then the restriction is likely content-based.70 If the answer
61. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
62. See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925) (“For present purposes we may
and do assume that freedom of speech and of the press—which are protected by the First
Amendment from abridgment by Congress—are among the fundamental personal rights and
‘liberties’ protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from
impairment by the States.”).
63. See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 641 (1994) (“At the heart of the
First Amendment lies the principle that each person should decide for himself or herself the
ideas and beliefs deserving of expression, consideration, and adherence.”).
64. See, e.g., Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of W. N.Y., 519 U.S. 357, 376 (1997)
(upholding a regulation that prohibited protesters from impeding physical access to abortion
clinics against a First Amendment challenge because the government interests underlying
the prohibition, including public safety, were significant).
65. See R. George Wright, Content-Based and Content-Neutral Regulation of Speech:
The Limitations of a Common Distinction, 60 U. MIAMI L. REV. 333, 333 (2006) (explaining
that speech is regulated either on the basis of its content or “on grounds that are neutral
toward [its] content”).
66. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 386, 388 (1992) (describing the different
types of speech restrictions in the context of a First Amendment challenge to a local
ordinance banning bias-motivated disorderly conduct).
67. See Geoffrey R. Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 46, 47
(1987) (providing examples of laws that regulate speech or expression on the basis of the
message conveyed).
68. See id. at 48 (providing examples of restrictions that regulate speech or expression
on the basis of factors others than the message conveyed).
69. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 642 (1994) (quoting Ward v. Rock
Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989)).
70. See id. at 643 (noting that laws that distinguish favored ideas or views from
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is “no,” then the restriction is likely content-neutral.71
The distinction between content-based and content-neutral restrictions is
important because this distinction determines the level of judicial scrutiny
applied.72 In general, content-based restrictions are considered more
detrimental to the Constitution’s guarantee of free speech.73 As such, the
Supreme Court has held that speech that is regulated because of its content
is subject to strict judicial scrutiny.74 This is the most exacting standard of
scrutiny and is difficult to meet.75 To survive strict scrutiny, a law must be
“narrowly tailored to serve . . . a compelling state interest.”76 An example
of the exacting nature of this standard can be found in United States v.
Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc.,77 a Supreme Court case involving a
First Amendment challenge to a law that required cable operators to
scramble or limit sexually explicit programming during certain hours.78
The Court reasoned that the restriction was content-based (targeting only
sexually explicit programming) and thus subject to strict scrutiny.79 The
Court then held that the law failed to satisfy the strict scrutiny test because
the government’s interest in protecting children from viewing sexually
disfavored ones are content-based).
71. See id. (observing that “laws that confer benefits” without referring to the ideas or
views of the content regulated are “in most instances content neutral”).
72. See Ashutosh Bhagwat, Purpose Scrutiny in Constitutional Analysis, 85 CALIF. L.
REV. 297, 304–05 (1997) (explaining that a speech regulation is subject to strict scrutiny if it
is “content-based,” and an intermediate form of scrutiny if “content-neutral”); see also
Wright, supra note 65, at 333 (discussing the argument of one prominent constitutional law
scholar that “today, virtually every free speech case turns on the application of the
distinction between content-based and content-neutral laws” (alteration omitted) (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
73. See Wright, supra note 65, at 334–35 (arguing that content-based restrictions are
considered “worse” than content-neutral restrictions because they are powerful tools with
which to stifle public debate); see also City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 60 (1994)
(O’Connor, J., concurring) (“[C]ontent-based speech restrictions are especially likely to be
improper attempts to value some forms of speech over others, or are particularly susceptible
to being used by the government to distort public debate.”).
74. See Republican Party of Minn. v. White (White I), 536 U.S. 765, 774–75 (2002)
(affirming that regulations on speech “about the qualifications of candidates for public
office” are subject to strict scrutiny).
75. See Turner Broad. Sys., 512 U.S. at 680 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (explaining that to survive strict scrutiny, “[i]t is not enough that the goals
of the law be legitimate, or reasonable, or even praiseworthy . . . [t]here must be some
pressing public necessity”).
76. White I, 536 U.S. at 775. “Narrowly tailored” means that the regulation in question
must “operate without unnecessarily circumscribing protected expression.” Brown v.
Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 54 (1982). A “compelling state interest” is a “pervasive, nationwide
problem” that must be addressed. United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803,
823 (2000) (holding that the state failed to show that explicit television programming was so
harmful and boundless as to justify a sweeping restriction on such programming).
77. 529 U.S. 803 (2000).
78. Id. at 806.
79. See id. at 811–13 (observing that the regulation at issue “limited Playboy’s market
as a penalty for its programming choice”).
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explicit material was not “sufficiently compelling” to warrant such a farreaching restriction.80 In addition, the law was not narrowly tailored
because a less restrictive alternative, an “opt-in” for a scrambling service,
was available.81
Speech regulations that are content-neutral are subject to intermediate
judicial scrutiny.82 Intermediate scrutiny is a less “rigorous” standard than
strict scrutiny and therefore more easily met.83 To pass intermediate
scrutiny, the law must further an important government interest that is
unrelated to the suppression of free expression and must be no more
expansive than essential to further the interest.84 In Fraternal Order of
Police, North Dakota State Lodge v. Stenehjem,85 the United States Court
of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit applied intermediate scrutiny in a case
involving a First Amendment challenge to a state law that prohibited
telephone solicitations by charitable organizations to North Dakota
residents who registered with the state’s “do-not-call” list.86 First, the court
determined that the law was content-neutral because the state had not
enacted the law “because of any disagreement with the message that would
be conveyed.”87 After determining that the law was content-neutral, the
court applied intermediate scrutiny and determined that the state had a
legitimate and significant interest in protecting the “tranquility” and
“privacy” of the homes of North Dakotans.88 Furthermore, the court
observed that the law did not burden speech beyond the extent necessary to
achieve its goals, as the law only applied to personal residences.89 Having
80. Id. at 825.
81. See id. at 822–27 (detailing the alternative of allowing subscribers to voluntarily
block content they found offensive). The Court also noted that the government was arguing
that the decision or inaction of parents not to block the offending channels was to be
superseded by the scrambling regulation. Id. at 825.
82. See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 661–62 (1994) (concluding that
the appropriate standard by which to evaluate the constitutionality of a regulation requiring
the inclusion of local television stations is the intermediate level of scrutiny applicable to
content-neutral restrictions that impose an incidental burden on speech).
83. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 213 (1997) (explaining that contentneutral regulations do not endanger free expression in the same manner as content-based
ones, and “thus are subject to a less rigorous analysis, which affords the Government
latitude”).
84. See Tool Box v. Ogden City Corp., 355 F.3d 1236, 1240 (10th Cir. 2004) (en banc)
(describing one four-part test used to assess laws when the state interest in the law is
unrelated to the content of the speech: (1) the government must have the power to enact the
law; (2) the law must further a government interest; (3) the government interest must not be
related to the message the speech expresses; and (4) the restriction is not broader than
necessary to further the government interest).
85. 431 F.3d 591 (8th Cir. 2005).
86. Id. at 596.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 597.
89. Id. at 598–99.
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passed intermediate scrutiny, the court upheld the prohibition on telephone
solicitations.90
However, the Supreme Court has notably upheld a “narrow class of
speech restrictions” that otherwise would not satisfy judicial scrutiny tests
“based on an interest in allowing governmental entities to perform their
functions.”91 The Court’s rationale in upholding this particular type of
speech restriction was illustrated by its decision in United States Civil
Service Commission v. National Ass’n of Letter Carriers.92 In Letter
Carriers, the Court upheld the Hatch Act, a law that prohibited federal
employees from taking an active role in political management or a political
campaign.93 The Court did not apply the traditional First Amendment
standards of review—neither strict nor intermediate scrutiny was
utilized.94 Instead, the Court based its judgment on four important
government interests: ensuring that federal employees execute the will of
Congress and not their own political parties; ensuring that Americans
maintain confidence in the federal government; ensuring that advancement
in the federal government is not dependent on political performance; and
ensuring that the federal workforce was not employed to create an
invincible political machine.95 The Court emphasized that its decision to
uphold the Hatch Act against a First Amendment challenge was buttressed
by the nation’s long history of ensuring that “federal service . . . depend[s]
upon meritorious performance rather than political service.”96
Following Letter Carriers, the Court upheld similar restrictions that
burden speech by reasoning that some restrictions are necessary to support

90. See id. at 599 (concluding that the content-neutral statute did not “entirely foreclose
any means of communication,” and thus was “sufficiently tailored to pass constitutional
muster”).
91. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 899 (2010) (discussing a category of speech
restrictions not subject to the usual forms of First Amendment scrutiny); see, e.g., Bethel
Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683 (1986) (upholding speech restrictions
imposed by a school board to protect the goals and functions of public education); U.S.
Civil Serv. Comm’n v. Nat’l Ass’n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 557 (1973) (ensuring
that federal employees are retained based on their performance instead of political service).
92. 413 U.S. 548 (1973).
93. Id. at 567. The Hatch Act limits partisan political activities by government
employees, such as using their government positions for political gain or performing
partisan activities in return for government employment. Hatch Political Activities Act, 18
U.S.C. §§ 594, 595, 598, 600, 601, 604, 605 (2006).
94. See Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. at 566–67 (declining to analyze the Hatch Act under a
prevailing First Amendment standard of review and instead simply stating that the First
Amendment does not invalidate a law barring political activities by government employees).
95. Id. at 565–66.
96. Id. at 557. The Court went on to chronicle historical decisions by American leaders
that demonstrate a dedication to ensuring that politics do not mix with federal service. Id. at
557–60.
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government operations.97 For example, in Parker v. Levy,98 the Court
confirmed the constitutionality of a military rule that prohibited enlisted
soldiers from publicly encouraging fellow soldiers to refuse orders.99 The
Court argued that the obedience and discipline required of military
personnel made it acceptable for the military to implement speech
restrictions on its service members in a manner that would otherwise be
unconstitutional.100 Similarly, in Bethel School District No. 403 v.
Fraser,101 the Court affirmed the constitutionality of a school sanction
imposed on a student who used vulgar and offensive language and gestures
during a school assembly.102 The Court reasoned that to fulfill the “role
and purpose” of the public school system, limiting “the use of vulgar terms
in public discourse” is “a highly appropriate function of public school
education.”103 In short, while the constitutionality of speech restrictions is
usually contingent on surviving a judicial scrutiny test, Letter Carriers and
its progeny demonstrate that the Supreme Court will lay strict and
intermediate scrutiny aside in the face of a critically important government
interest.
2.

Overview of campaign finance law
Campaign finance regulations are another subset of the law of free
speech. The Supreme Court has held that campaign financing, including
the solicitation of campaign donations, is considered “speech” under the
First Amendment.104 In 1976, the Supreme Court decided Buckley v.
Valeo, a seminal case establishing the framework for assessing the
constitutionality of campaign finance regulations.105 Buckley addressed the
constitutionality of a federal law, the Federal Election Campaign Act,106
97. See Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 899 (2010) (noting that the Supreme
Court has upheld speech restrictions because certain governmental functions would cease to
function otherwise).
98. 417 U.S. 733 (1974).
99. Id. at 736–39, 758–61.
100. Id. at 758.
101. 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
102. Id. at 677–79, 685 (concluding that the school district was within its authority in
sanctioning a student for obscene speech).
103. Id. at 681–83.
104. See FEC v. Nat’l Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 493 (1985)
(holding that a law prohibiting some forms of campaign expenditures involved “speech at
the core of the First Amendment”); see also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14 (1976) (per
curiam) (declaring that a law’s political “contribution and expenditure limitations operate[d]
in an area of the most fundamental First Amendment activities”).
105. See Politics Glossary:
Buckley v. Valeo, WASHINGTONPOST.COM,
http://projects.washingtonpost.com/politicsglossary/campaign-finance/Buckley-v-Valeo
(last visited Sept. 19, 2011) (calling Buckley “[t]he landmark Supreme Court case on
campaign finance”).
106. The Federal Election Campaign Act was enacted in 1971 in response to a “wave of
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that limited federal campaign contributions and expenditures.107
Noting that the First Amendment guarantees freedom of expression and
association, the Court affirmed that both campaign contributions and
expenditures are speech and thus protected by these two aspects of the First
Amendment.108 The Court distinguished between contributions and
expenditures in the realm of political expression, holding that a limitation
on campaign expenditures “represent[s] [a] substantial . . . restraint[] on the
quantity and diversity of political speech,” whereas a limitation on the
amount that a person may contribute “entails only a marginal restriction
upon the contributor’s ability to engage in free communication.”109
Similarly, the Court held that while limitations on expenditures severely
impinge on freedom of association by “preclud[ing] most associations from
effectively amplifying the voice of their adherents,” the limitation on
contributions leaves a contributor “free to become a member of any
political association and to assist personally in the association’s efforts on
behalf of candidates.”110 As a result, the Court held that strict scrutiny
must be applied to regulations on expenditures because they encroach on
freedoms guaranteed by the First Amendment,111 while limitations on
campaign contributions must only be supported by a “sufficiently

public sentiment that money was influencing politics on a large scale.” Christopher A.
McNulty, Note, Campaign Finance Law & the First Amendment—Can You See the Light?:
Illuminating Precedent and Creating a New Tier of Judicial Scrutiny for Campaign Finance
Laws. Randall v. Sorrell, 126 S. Ct. 2479 (2006), 30 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 149, 153
(2007).
107. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 15 (1976) (per curiam). A campaign expenditure is
money that a person, group, or campaign spends on political communications or activities.
See id. at 19. A campaign contribution is money that a person or group donates to a
campaign. See id. at 20–21.
108. See id. at 14–18 (explaining that contribution and expenditure limits affect the
discussion of public issues and qualifications of political candidates and therefore are
subject to First Amendment protections, which include unfettered political expression and
political association). The Court considered political expression to be free discussion and
exchange of ideas, and it considered political association to be the coming together of
individuals and groups for the purpose of advancing a belief or idea. Id. at 14–15.
109. Id. at 19–20. In explaining why a limitation on campaign expenditures was a
“substantial” restriction on speech, the Court explained that:
A restriction on the amount of money a person or group can spend on political
communication during a campaign necessarily reduces the quantity of expression
by restricting the number of issues discussed, the depth of their exploration, and the
size of the audience reached. This is because virtually every means of
communicating ideas in today’s mass society requires the expenditure of money.
Id. at 19. The Court also noted that contribution limitations are only a “marginal restriction”
on speech because a contributor is still free to associate with a political party or directly
assist with a candidate’s campaign efforts. Id. at 20–21.
110. Id. at 22.
111. See id. at 44–45 (declaring that the “governmental interest in preventing corruption
and the appearance of corruption” was inadequate in justifying an intrusion upon political
speech).
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important” state interest and be “closely drawn to avoid unnecessary
abridgement of associational freedoms.”112
The Court did not classify the Buckley framework as a form of
intermediate or strict scrutiny.113 Nevertheless, the Court employed this
standard to uphold a limitation on contributions to candidates because it
recognized a “sufficiently important” governmental interest in “the
prevention of corruption and the appearance of corruption.”114 The Court
attributed the constitutionally-sufficient nature of these interests to the
American system of public financing in elections and the candidates’ need
for contributions to campaign.115 The Court reasoned that, if left
unrestrained, contributors could donate large amounts of money to “secure
a political quid pro quo” and harm the integrity of the American system of
government in the process.116
After Buckley, the Court affirmed the distinction between expenditure
and contribution regulations by explicitly declaring that expenditure and
contribution limits are controlled by different standards of scrutiny.117
Furthermore, decisions handed down after Buckley helped to clarify its
framework.118 For example, in Randall v. Sorrell,119 the Court noted that it
“cannot determine with any degree of exactitude” whether a statute limiting
campaign contributions is precisely tailored to meet a state’s legitimate
objective.120 Rather, the Court recognized that Buckley established the
existence of a “lower bound” under which a regulation would be so
restrictive as to violate the First Amendment.121 Specifically, the Court
explained that contribution limits that are so low that they impede a

112. Id. at 25.
113. Compare Mark Spottswood, Comment, Free Speech and Due Process Problems in
the Regulation and Financing of Judicial Election Campaigns, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 331, 338
(2007) (identifying the “closely drawn” standard as a form of intermediate scrutiny), with
McNulty, supra note 106, at 175–76 (arguing that the Buckley Court created a new form of
“semi-strict scrutiny”).
114. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 25–27.
115. Id. at 26.
116. Id. at 26–27.
117. See FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 259–60 (1986) (“We have
consistently held that restrictions on contributions require less compelling justification than
restrictions on independent spending.”).
118. See, e.g., Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 247–50 (2006) (determining a state
contribution limit was “too low and too strict to survive” Buckley’s “closely drawn”
scrutiny); Cal. Med. Ass’n v. FEC, 453 U.S. 182, 184–85 (1981) (holding that limits on
contributions to political action committees are constitutional under the First Amendment).
119. 548 U.S. 230 (2006).
120. Id. at 248.
121. See id. at 247–48 (explaining that in Buckley, the Court recognized that
“contribution restrictions could have a severe impact on political dialogue if the limitations
prevented candidates and political committees from amassing the resources necessary for
effective advocacy” (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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candidate’s ability to run an effective campaign cannot be upheld under the
Buckley framework.122
In the recently decided case of Citizens United v. FEC,123 the Supreme
Court maintained the Buckley framework. Citizens United involved a
federal law that banned corporations and unions from using general
treasury funds to make expenditures for “electioneering communication” or
to advocate for the election or defeat of a candidate.124 The Court struck
down the law, holding that “the Government may not suppress political
speech on the basis of the speaker’s corporate identity . . . [because] [n]o
sufficient governmental interest justifies limits on the political speech of
nonprofit or for-profit corporations.”125 Significantly, the Court left the
Buckley rules on contributions intact and merely extended Buckley’s
holding regarding independent expenditures.126 Therefore, the standard of
review used to assess the constitutionality of campaign contribution
limitations is the more than thirty-year-old Buckley standard: a restriction
on campaign contributions will be upheld if it is supported by a
“sufficiently important” state interest and is “closely drawn” to avoid
impinging on fundamental freedoms.127
D. Rulings on the Constitutionality of the Solicitation Ban
The Supreme Court has not directly addressed the constitutionality of a
state judicial solicitation ban.128 However, in 2002, the Supreme Court
decided Republican Party of Minnesota v. White129 (White I), the leading
case involving a challenge to a state judicial code of conduct provision
limiting speech.130 In White I, a candidate for judicial office sued

122. See id. at 247–49 (noting that low contribution limits would weaken democratic
accountability by discouraging challengers running against incumbent officeholders).
123. 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
124. Id. at 886 (internal quotation marks omitted).
125. Id. at 913.
126. See id. at 908 (“The Buckley Court . . . sustained limits on direct contributions in
order to ensure against the reality or appearance of corruption. That case did not extend this
rationale to independent expenditures and the Court does not do so here.”).
127. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 25 (1976) (per curiam).
128. As discussed in Part I.B of this Comment, the ABA’s recommended solicitation ban
prohibits a judicial candidate from personally soliciting or accepting campaign funds, but it
allows a candidate to form a committee to solicit on his or her behalf. MODEL CODE OF
JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 4.1(A)(8) (2011). To date, thirty-one states have enacted some form
of the model solicitation ban. See Methods of Judicial Selection, supra note 29 (conducting
a state-by-state review of judicial campaign conduct rules).
129. 536 U.S. 765 (2002).
130. See Richard L. Hasen, First Amendment Limits on Regulating Judicial Campaigns,
in RUNNING FOR JUDGE: THE RISING POLITICAL, FINANCIAL, AND LEGAL STAKES OF JUDICIAL
ELECTIONS 15, 22–23 (Matthew J. Streb ed., 2007) (noting that White I was the first
Supreme Court decision on the constitutionality of a canon of the judicial code of conduct).
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Minnesota’s judicial ethics office, arguing that the state supreme court’s
canon of judicial conduct prohibiting judicial candidates from announcing
their views on disputed legal or political issues violated the First
Amendment.131 The Court interpreted the scope of the canon broadly; thus,
the canon was deemed to prohibit a candidate “from stating his views on
any specific non-fanciful legal question within the province of the court for
which he is running.”132 After defining the meaning of the canon, the Court
determined that the announce clause was subject to strict scrutiny because
it “both prohibit[ed] speech on the basis of its content and burden[ed] a
category of speech that is ‘at the core of our First Amendment freedoms’—
speech about the qualifications of candidates for public office.”133
The Court used strict scrutiny to analyze the two state interests
supporting the announce clause: “preserving the impartiality of the state
judiciary and preserving the appearance of the impartiality of the state
judiciary.”134 After assessing the state interests using three different
meanings of “impartiality,”135 the Court dismissed both interests
(depending on what definition of “impartiality” it employed) as either not
compelling or not narrowly tailored.136 While the case did not deal with the
solicitation ban,137 the decision is important because it influenced
subsequent federal court decisions regarding First Amendment challenges
to judicial codes of conduct, including the solicitation ban.138
The solicitation ban has been challenged in federal courts both before
and after White I. The courts that have addressed the issue have used a
myriad of approaches to determine the constitutionality of the ban and have
arrived at a variety of rulings. In 1991, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit heard a federal case involving the solicitation ban in
131. White I, 536 U.S. at 768–70.
132. Id. at 773 (noting that exceptions to the rule include discussing past decisions or
expressing the view that a judge is not bound by stare decisis).
133. Id. at 773–74 (quoting Republican Party of Minn. v. Kelly, 247 F.3d 854, 861, 863
(8th Cir. 2001), rev’d, 536 U.S. 765 (2002)).
134. Id. at 775.
135. The “root meaning” of “impartiality” is a “lack of bias for or against either party to
the proceeding.” Id. Alternative meanings include a “lack of preconception in favor of or
against a particular legal view,” and “open-mindedness.” Id. at 777–78.
136. Id. at 774–83 (discussing each of three possible definitions of “impartiality” and
holding that the Minnesota judicial canon was not narrowly-tailored enough to have been
aimed at that definition of “impartiality” in judges).
137. See Young, supra note 21, at 434 (positing that the White I Court stated with clarity
that “its holding applies only to the announce clause”).
138. See Carey v. Wolnitzek, 614 F.3d 189, 199 (6th Cir. 2010) (discussing federal
circuit decisions that have relied on White I to analyze the constitutionality of challenged
provisions of state codes of judicial conduct); see also Young supra note 21, at 434
(commenting that the White I decision sent officials from states with elected judiciaries
“scrambling to their codebooks to determine how this decision will affect their statutes and
future judicial elections”).
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Stretton v. Disciplinary Board.139 The Third Circuit decided that a
Pennsylvania judicial candidate’s challenge to the state’s solicitation ban
should be analyzed using strict scrutiny.140 The court upheld the ban,
however, concluding that the state’s interest in preserving judicial integrity
was compelling and that the ban was narrowly tailored to meet this
interest.141
The White I decision was handed down before the next challenge to the
solicitation ban was brought before a federal court. Notably, in Weaver v.
Bonner,142 the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
struck down a state solicitation ban on free speech grounds.143 In Weaver, a
Georgia judicial candidate challenged a state solicitation ban that
prohibited elected judges and judicial candidates from personally soliciting
campaign funds or public support, while still allowing them to form
campaign committees to operate on their behalf.144 Applying strict
scrutiny, the court conceded that Georgia’s interests in “preserving the
integrity, impartiality, and independence of the judiciary” were
compelling.145 But the court decided that the solicitation ban was not
narrowly tailored: the risks to judicial impartiality were not lessened by the
ban because candidates could still solicit by proxy through a committee.146
Reasoning that the solicitation ban did not adequately address the state’s
interest in impartiality,147 the court essentially struck down the solicitation
ban as underinclusive.148
In the 2005 case Republican Party of Minnesota v. White149 (White II),
the Eighth Circuit joined the Eleventh Circuit in striking down a state

139. 944 F.2d 137 (3d Cir. 1991).
140. See id. at 146 (applying the language of strict scrutiny in requiring a “compelling
state interest” that is “narrowly tailored” to determine whether the state’s judicial
solicitation ban is constitutional).
141. See id. (reasoning that Pennsylvania’s interest in a judicial solicitation ban is
compelling because personal solicitation “lends itself to the appearance of coercion” and
narrowly tailored because a “state is permitted to take steps, albeit tiny ones, that only
partially solve a problem without totally eradicating it”).
142. 309 F.3d 1312 (11th Cir. 2002).
143. See id. at 1322–23 (invalidating Georgia’s solicitation ban for failure to meet strict
scrutiny as applied to limitations on speech).
144. Id. at 1315.
145. Id. at 1319 (internal quotation marks omitted).
146. See id. at 1323 (explaining that restrictions on the source of solicitations do not
accomplish the state’s interest because “[s]uccessful candidates will feel beholden to the
people who helped them get elected regardless of who did the soliciting of support”).
147. See id. at 1322 (concluding that the solicitation ban failed strict scrutiny).
148. See Trans Union Corp. v. FTC, 267 F.3d 1138, 1143 (D.C. Cir. 2001)
(“Underinclusiveness analysis ‘ensure[s] that the proffered state interest actually underlies
the law . . . .’” (quoting Blount v. SEC, 61 F.3d 938, 946 (D.C. Cir. 1995))).
149. 416 F.3d 738 (8th Cir. 2005) (en banc).
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solicitation ban.150 On remand from the Supreme Court in White I, the
Eighth Circuit in White II reheard a challenge to Minnesota’s solicitation
ban.151 The court applied strict scrutiny and held that while the state’s
interest in impartiality was compelling,152 the solicitation ban was not
narrowly tailored as candidates did not learn the identity of contributors
because contributions were made to a candidate’s campaign committee.153
Therefore, the candidate could not be biased to contributors while on the
bench.154 By concluding that the solicitation ban’s proscription on
candidate speech was unnecessary because the use of campaign committees
alleviated any risk to judicial impartiality, the court essentially struck down
the ban due to its overinclusiveness.155
In response to the White II decision, Minnesota narrowed its solicitation
ban in an attempt to pass a strict scrutiny analysis.156 The narrowed ban
was again challenged in Wersal v. Sexton,157 and once again, the Eighth
Circuit applied strict scrutiny to strike down the state’s solicitation ban as
150. See id. at 766 (“[T]he . . . solicitation clause[] . . . [does] not survive strict scrutiny
and thus violate[s] the First Amendment.”).
151. See id. at 744–45 (describing the procedural history of the case, culminating in a
remand to the Eighth Circuit).
152. See id. at 765 (agreeing that the state had a compelling interest in keeping
candidates who may be elected to the bench from soliciting contributions from litigants who
may come before them).
153. See id. (observing that the state’s solicitation ban allows contributions to be made
directly and only to a candidate’s campaign committee, so long as a candidate has no
knowledge of donor identity).
154. See id. (positing that since the state’s solicitation ban ensures that contributions are
funneled through a candidate’s campaign committee, a candidate would not be able to track
who has and has not contributed to the campaign).
155. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1213 (9th ed. 2009) (defining “overinclusive” as
“extending beyond the class of persons intended to be protected or regulated; burdening
more persons than necessary to cure the problem”). The use of the term “overinclusive” in
this Comment should not be confused with the “overbreadth doctrine.” BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY 1213 (9th ed. 2009) (defining the “overbreadth doctrine” as “[t]he doctrine
holding that if a statute is so broadly written that it deters free expression, then it can be
struck down on its face because of its chilling effect—even if it also prohibits acts that may
legitimately be forbidden”).
156. The revised ban allowed judicial candidates to:
(a) make a general request for campaign contributions when speaking to an
audience of twenty or more people;
(b) sign letters, for distribution by the candidate’s campaign committee, soliciting
campaign contributions, if the letters direct contributions to be sent to the address
of the candidate’s campaign committee and not that of the candidate; and
(c) personally solicit campaign contributions from members of the judge’s family,
from a person with whom the judge has an intimate relationship, or from judges
over whom the judge does not exercise supervisory or appellate authority.
Wersal v. Sexton, 613 F.3d 821, 839 (8th Cir. 2010).
157. 613 F.3d 821 (8th Cir. 2010). Interestingly, the judicial candidate who brought the
challenge to the narrowed solicitation ban in Wersal was one of the candidates who
challenged the announce clause in White I and Minnesota’s original solicitation ban in White
II. See id. at 826 (“This case has its roots in Republican Party of Minnesota v. White . . . .”).
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not narrowly tailored to meet the government’s compelling interest of
impartiality.158 The court observed that the risk to judicial impartiality
stemmed from the contribution itself, not the judicial solicitation; therefore,
the solicitation ban did not address the state’s interest of impartiality.159
Moreover, the court held that because Minnesota already enacted a less
restrictive alternative to prevent candidates from learning the source of
campaign contributions, the solicitation ban was not narrowly tailored to
meet the state’s interest in unbiased judges.160
Following Weaver, White II, and their progeny, it appeared as though the
trend was for federal courts to apply strict scrutiny to state solicitation bans
and strike down the bans.161 However, the rationales for invalidating the
bans in Weaver and White II were very different. In Weaver, the Third
Circuit concluded that the Georgia solicitation ban was underinclusive
because it did not go far enough to remedy the problem of improper
influence of judges.162 In contrast, the Eighth Circuit in White II struck
down the Minnesota ban as overinclusive because less restrictive means of
reaching the state’s goal existed.163
In June 2010, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
bucked the post-White II trend of overturning state solicitation bans and
upheld a ban on First Amendment grounds.164 In Siefert v. Alexander,165 an
elected judge challenged several provisions of the Wisconsin Code of
Judicial Conduct, including a solicitation ban.166 Unlike the courts in

158. See id. at 839–41 (discussing the standard of scrutiny required, settling on strict
scrutiny, and invalidating the law as not narrowly tailored).
159. See id. at 840 (“[T]he real due process harm comes not from the fundraising itself,
but rather from a judicial candidate being able to trace contributions back to individual
donors.”).
160. See id. (considering an existing Minnesota canon, which instructs candidates to take
“reasonable measures” to not obtain information about campaign contributors, to be a less
restrictive alternative to prevent candidates from learning the source of their campaign funds
(citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
161. See supra notes 144–61 and accompanying text.
162. See Weaver v. Bonner, 309 F.3d 1312, 1322–23 (11th Cir. 2002) (arguing that
Georgia’s judicial solicitation ban was not narrowly tailored since the risks to judicial
impartiality were not lessened by the ban as candidates could still solicit by proxy through a
committee).
163. See Republican Party of Minn. v. White (White II), 416 F.3d 738, 765 (8th Cir.
2005) (en banc) (reasoning that Minnesota’s judicial solicitation ban unnecessarily
proscribes speech because the use of a judicial campaign committee adequately addresses
risks of campaign contributions on judicial impartiality).
164. See Siefert v. Alexander, 608 F.3d 974, 990 (7th Cir. 2010) (holding that a
Wisconsin solicitation ban was constitutional because it was narrowly tailored to promote
the state’s compelling interest of protecting the integrity of the judiciary), cert. denied, 131
S. Ct. 2872 (2011).
165. 608 F.3d 974 (7th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 2872 (2011).
166. See id. at 978–79 (noting that the plaintiff challenged three provisions adopted by
Wisconsin in 2004, including the political party affiliation ban and partisan intervention
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Weaver, White II, and Wersal, the Seventh Circuit reviewed the ban using
the Buckley framework, analogizing the effect of the ban to a campaign
finance regulation.167 Under the “less rigorous ‘closely drawn’ scrutiny”
standard, the court held that the ban served the same anti-corruption
rationale described in Buckley and furthered judicial impartiality.168 The
court went further in discerning that the ban was drawn close enough to the
state’s interest in an impartial judiciary, despite the fact that judges and
candidates could still learn the identities of those who had contributed to
their campaigns.169 Even though the solicitation ban did not completely
eradicate the link between judges, candidates, and contributors, the court
concluded that the ban still passed constitutional muster under the “closely
drawn” standard because the personal solicitation itself presented the
greatest danger to judicial impartiality and the appearance of judicial
impartiality.170
Adding to the smorgasbord of case law concerning state solicitation
bans, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit weighed in
just a month after the Seventh Circuit decided Siefert. In Carey v.
Wolnitzek,171 the Sixth Circuit applied strict scrutiny to Kentucky’s
solicitation ban.172 Conceding that the state’s interest in an impartial
judiciary was compelling, the court focused on the narrow tailoring
component of the strict scrutiny test.173 The court observed that the
solicitation ban prohibited a range of solicitations, including speeches and
mass mailings, which presented little risk to the impartiality of a judge.174
As such, the court struck down the ban as overreaching.175
ban).
167. Id. at 988.
168. See id. at 988–89 (concluding that the Wisconsin solicitation ban was not subject to
strict scrutiny under Buckley and upholding the ban).
169. See id. at 990 (observing that the solicitation ban was narrowly tailored to
accomplish the state’s compelling aims “without impairing more speech than necessary”).
170. See id. (declaring that there was no narrower alternative to address the problem
posed by personal solicitations). After Siefert, the constitutionality of judicial solicitation
bans was once again challenged in the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit. Bauer v. Shepard, 620 F.3d 704, 707 (7th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 2872
(2011). The Seventh Circuit reaffirmed its Siefert decision and maintained that Siefert is
controlling in the jurisdiction. See id. at 710 (“[T]here is no reason to depart from the
approach taken so recently in this circuit.”).
171. 614 F.3d 189 (6th Cir. 2010).
172. See id. at 198–99 (reasoning that strict scrutiny applied to the solicitation ban
because the ban implicated fundamentally protected speech by stopping candidates from
soliciting campaign support).
173. Id. at 204.
174. See id. at 205 (arguing that it is unreasonable to believe that a potential litigant’s
failure to respond to a judicial candidate’s mass mailing or speech to a large audience
requesting contributions would result in negative treatment from a judge).
175. See id. at 206–07 (holding that Kentucky’s solicitation ban goes beyond prohibiting
judges from making “direct, personal solicitations” to litigants who have cases pending in
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In total, five federal appellate courts have analyzed state solicitation bans
and have arrived at just as many holdings, methods of analysis, and
reasoning.176
The circuit splits over the constitutionality of state
solicitation bans on judicial candidates make the issue ripe for Supreme
Court review.
II. STRICT SCRUTINY SHOULD NOT BE USED TO ANALYZE JUDICIAL
SOLICITATION BANS
Constitutional commentators are quick to categorize solicitation bans as
regulating core political speech and thus conclude that they are
automatically subject to strict scrutiny.177 However, as the spectrum of
decisions on the constitutionality of the solicitation ban demonstrates, the
courts have not reached a consensus on this front. For example, even
though Siefert and Carey were decided just weeks apart,178 the Seventh
Circuit in Siefert presumed that the Buckley framework should be used to
analyze a state solicitation ban,179 and the Sixth Circuit in Carey just as
easily determined that strict scrutiny should be applied.180 This confusion
among the courts of appeals indicates that the question of the appropriate
level of scrutiny employed for state solicitation bans is unresolved.
There are three arguments against using strict scrutiny in analyzing the
constitutionality of judicial solicitation bans. First, the Supreme Court has
shied away from subjecting solicitation bans to strict scrutiny.181 Second,
judicial solicitation bans resemble a class of speech restrictions that the
Court has historically upheld to keep the government functioning.182 Third,
solicitation bans have been improperly categorized as content-based
regulations on political speech when they are content-neutral, and thus not
subject to strict scrutiny.183

the judge’s court, thus being “overbroad and . . . invalid” (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
176. This description does not include the Eighth Circuit’s decision in Wersal since the
Wersal court effectively reanalyzed the same statute presented in White II.
177. See Spottswood, supra note 113, at 347 (noting that, as of 2007, every federal court
addressing the solicitation ban subjected it to strict scrutiny since the “Solicitation Canon
regulates core political speech based on its content”).
178. Siefert was decided on June 14, 2010, 608 F.3d 974, 974 (7th Cir. 2010), cert.
denied., 131 S. Ct. 2872 (2011), and Carey was decided on July 13, 2010, 614 F.3d at 189.
179. See Siefert, 608 F.3d at 988 (noting that the ban was, at its core, a campaign finance
regulation and thus reviewable under the Buckley framework).
180. See Carey, 614 F.3d at 198 (applying strict scrutiny to the solicitation ban).
181. See infra Part II.A.
182. See infra Part II.B.
183. See infra Part II.C.
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A. The Supreme Court Has Declined to Prescribe Strict Scrutiny as the
Appropriate Standard for This Type of Speech Restriction
Although it has had the opportunity to do so, the Supreme Court has not
prescribed strict scrutiny as the standard of analysis for judicial solicitation
bans. Recently, the Siefert opinion, which upheld the constitutionality of a
state solicitation ban under the Buckley framework, was appealed to the
Supreme Court.184 The Court denied certiorari, allowing the Siefert
decision to stand.185
Furthermore, although it has been argued that the Supreme Court’s
decision in White I prescribes strict scrutiny as the standard for judicial
codes of conduct,186 the White I decision was anything but clear on this
issue. Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, admitted that the Court was
“neither assert[ing] nor imply[ing] that the First Amendment requires
campaigns for judicial office to sound the same as those for legislative
office.”187 This statement suggested that the Court believed the regulations
on judicial elections could be different, if not tighter, than those on
legislative elections.
In invalidating the announce clause, Justice Scalia explained that the
clause was subject to strict scrutiny because it “both prohibits speech on the
basis of its content and burdens a category of speech that is ‘at the core of
our First Amendment freedoms’—speech about the qualifications of
candidates for public office.”188 Justice Scalia’s description of the
announce clause simply does not fit the solicitation ban.
The plain language of the solicitation ban indicates that its purpose is not
to prohibit speech on the basis of its content, but rather to prohibit the
association of two specific parties: a judge (or judicial candidate) and a
campaign contributor.189 In other words, the solicitation ban does not
prohibit the expression of certain ideas or beliefs; instead, it prohibits only
a certain, specific type of association.190 In addition, due to the
184. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Siefert v. Alexander, 131 S. Ct. 2872 (2011) (No.
10-405), 2010 WL 3722072.
185. 131 S. Ct. at 2872.
186. See, e.g., Carey v. Wolnitzek, 614 F.3d 189, 198 (6th Cir. 2010) (arguing that White
I applies strict scrutiny to judicial solicitation bans); Republican Party of Minn. v. White
(White II), 416 F.3d 738, 766 (8th Cir. 2005) (en banc) (“Upon further consideration of the .
. . solicitation [ban] in light of White, we hold that [it] likewise [does] not survive strict
scrutiny and thus violate[s] the First Amendment.”).
187. Republican Party of Minn. v. White (White I), 536 U.S. 765, 783 (2002).
188. Id. at 774 (quoting Republican Party of Minn. v. Kelly, 247 F.3d 854, 861 (8th Cir.
2001), rev’d, 536 U.S. 765 (2002)).
189. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 4(A)(8) (2011) (“[A] judge or a judicial
candidate shall not . . . personally solicit or accept campaign contributions other than
through a campaign committee . . . .”).
190. Id.
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permissibility of campaign committee solicitations and third-party
campaign expenditures, solicitation bans do not inhibit a judge or judicial
candidate’s ability to campaign in the same manner as announce clauses,
which prohibit judicial candidates from stating their views.191 The
difference between the announce clause—the subject of White I—and the
solicitation ban should give pause to automatically applying White I to
solicitation ban challenges.
Moreover, the Court’s rationale for striking down the announce clause
under strict scrutiny does not apply to solicitation bans. In White I, the
Court evaluated different definitions of impartiality192 to assess whether the
state’s interest in judicial impartiality was compelling and whether the
announce clause was narrowly tailored to meet that interest.193 The Court
dismissed the announce clause as not narrowly tailored to the “root
meaning” of impartiality—“the lack of bias for or against either party to
the proceeding”—because the announce clause restricted speech “for or
against particular issues.”194 The White I reasoning does not extend to
solicitation bans because such bans do not restrict speech related to issues.
Rather, solicitation bans are designed to address bias for or against either
party.195 The evident disconnect between the reasoning put forth by the
Supreme Court in White I and the purpose of the solicitation ban indicates
that the decision cannot be used like a cookie cutter to analyze
constitutional challenges to state solicitation bans.
B. Judicial Solicitation Bans Resemble a Class of Speech Restrictions
that are Upheld in the Interest of Keeping the Government Functioning
A second reason why solicitation bans should not be subject to strict
scrutiny is that such bans are similar to other speech restrictions that the
Court has upheld to keep the government functioning.196 As demonstrated
191. See White I, 536 U.S. at 773 (discussing the characteristics of announce clauses and
the burden they place on judicial candidates).
192. See supra note 135 (describing definitions of “impartiality” as lack of bias for or
against parties, lack of preconception in favor of a viewpoint, and “openness”).
193. See White I, 536 U.S. at 775–79 (offering three definitions for “impartiality” and
deciding that “the appearance of open-mindedness” lay behind the Minnesota announce
clause).
194. See id. (reviewing and rejecting varied interpretations of the state interest for lack of
narrow tailoring).
195. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 4.1(A)(8) (2011) (indicating that the
solicitation ban deals with the association between two parties—a judge and a contributor—
rather than with any legal or political issues).
196. See, e.g., Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683 (1986) (upholding
speech restrictions to protect the goals and functions of public education); U.S. Civil Serv.
Comm’n v. Nat’l Ass’n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 557 (1973) (affirming a
government interest in ensuring that federal employees are retained based on their
performance instead of political service).
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by Letter Carriers, the Court may decline to use a First Amendment
standard of review and may instead uphold speech restrictions to support a
confluence of strong government interests.197 In Letter Carriers, the Court
held that multiple interests warranted the existence of the Hatch Act:
ensuring that federal employees execute the will of Congress and not that
of their own political parties; ensuring that Americans maintain confidence
in the federal government; ensuring that advancement in the federal
government is not dependent on political performance; and ensuring that
the federal workforce was not employed to create an invincible political
machine.198 By upholding the Hatch Act’s speech restrictions in favor of
the interests set forth in Letter Carriers, the Court struck a balance between
the interests of government employees in engaging in political speech and
the interests of the government in functioning in an impartial and efficient
manner.199
The same argument can be made for the judicial solicitation ban. The
Supreme Court has held that Americans have a constitutional right to
litigate cases in an impartial setting.200 Moreover, impartiality has been
deemed by commentators as the most important characteristic of a judge.201
Judicial impartiality is integral to the functioning of the American
judiciary, and the solicitation ban seeks to preserve it.202 Thus, the Court’s
reasoning in Letter Carriers that the government’s interest in maintaining a
functioning government outweighs speech restrictions on federal
employees203 is applicable to judicial solicitation bans.

197. See Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. at 566–67 (declining to analyze the constitutionality
of the Hatch Act under a traditional First Amendment standard of review); see also Steven J.
Eberhard, Note, The Need for the Hatch Act, 1 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 153, 161–62 (1978)
(commenting that, in upholding the Hatch Act, the Supreme Court relied on a history of
restrictions on political activities in the interest of maintaining an impartial and efficient
government).
198. Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. at 564–65.
199. See id. at 564 (concluding that the goal is “to arrive at a balance between the
interests of the [employee], as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern and
the interest of the [government], as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public
service it performs through its employees” (quoting Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563,
568 (1968)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
200. See Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 61–62 (1972) (recognizing a
constitutional right to appear before “a neutral and detached judge”).
201. See, e.g., KOZLOWSKI & KRISHNA, supra note 3, at 2 (calling impartiality the
“defining characteristic” of a judge).
202. Commentators have suggested that the judiciary cannot function properly unless
judges are impartial because “[a] judge is supposed to decide cases based upon the evidence
presented and the applicable law.” Id.
203. See Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. at 564 (holding that the efficiency and effectiveness
of the federal government outweighs constitutional challenges to the Hatch Act).
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C. Judicial Solicitation Bans Are Not Content-Based Regulations
A third reason that state solicitation bans should not be subject to strict
scrutiny is that solicitation bans are not content-based regulations—the
purpose of the bans is not to regulate a particular message.204 A contentneutral speech restriction is one that disregards the ideas or views the
speech expresses.205 According to Supreme Court precedent, a court
should look to the face of the regulation to determine whether strict
scrutiny or a less exacting form of scrutiny should be applied to regulations
challenged under the First Amendment.206 If the regulation is neutral on its
face, then strict scrutiny does not apply.207
On its face, a solicitation ban is content-neutral. While it may seem that
the solicitation ban is focused on content—regulating whether a judge may
ask for contributions—the judicial “ask” is actually left untouched by the
regulation.208 The regulation merely pertains to the method of the “ask”
and does not ban the judicial “ask” itself.209 Under the Model Code, judges
and judicial candidates may form campaign committees to “ask” on their
behalf.210 While this may not be the most convenient way to ask for
campaign contributions, it does not negate that the content of a judicial
solicitation is left untouched by state solicitation bans. Applying the
Supreme Court’s reasoning in Buckley—that limiting campaign
contributions does not limit speech because contributors can still support
their candidate in other ways211—leads to the conclusion that solicitation
bans do not limit judges and judicial candidates’ speech because they can

204. See THODE, supra note 21, at 98 (reporting that the ABA model solicitation ban was
designed to mitigate the tension between “political necessity and judicial impartiality”); see
also MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 4.1(A)(8) (2011) (demonstrating that the
solicitation ban applies regardless of why a contributor may donate to a judge).
205. See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 642–43 (1994) (recognizing that
it is often difficult to distinguish between content-based and content-neutral speech, but
offering the general rule that “laws that by their terms distinguish favored speech from
disfavored speech on the basis of the ideas or views expressed are content based”).
206. See id. at 642 (explaining that the classification of a regulation as content-based or
content-neutral is “not always a simple task” but that the purpose is often facially evident).
207. See id. at 645 (concluding that the constitutionality of regulations on cable
providers is dependent on intermediate scrutiny since the regulations are facially neutral as
they “distinguish . . . based only upon the manner in which speakers transmit their messages
to viewers, and not upon the messages they carry”).
208. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 4(A)(8) (2011) (leaving judicial
candidates free to solicit through campaign committees).
209. See id. (indicating that judges may not ask for contributions directly, but may do so
through the medium of a committee).
210. Id.
211. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 21 (1976) (per curiam) (observing that
contribution limits are only a marginal burden on contributors because contributors are still
able to become members of political associations or assist personally in campaign efforts).
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still “ask” for money via campaign committees.212 For this reason, a less
exacting form of scrutiny should be used to assess the constitutionality of
state solicitation bans.
III. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF JUDICIAL SOLICITATION BANS SHOULD
BE ANALYZED USING THE BUCKLEY FRAMEWORK
Instead of strict scrutiny, the constitutionality of judicial solicitation bans
should be analyzed under the Buckley framework. There are two
arguments for using the Buckley framework: first, because the Supreme
Court has recently demonstrated support for its usefulness; and second,
because the analytical underpinnings of the Buckley framework apply to
judicial solicitation bans. Furthermore, if the Buckley framework is
employed for judicial solicitation bans, the bans should pass constitutional
muster.
A. The Supreme Court Recently Demonstrated Support for the Usefulness
of the Buckley Framework
The Supreme Court recently used the Buckley framework in Randall,
affirming its importance.213 In Randall, the Court specifically noted that it
must analyze a contribution limit by “[f]ollowing Buckley.”214 The Court
went on to assess the contribution limit through the lens of the Buckley
framework by determining whether it was “closely drawn” or “too low and
too strict to survive.”215 Even though the Court used the Buckley
framework to strike down the contribution limitation,216 the fact that the
Court used the framework affirms that the Court still views the Buckley
framework as an integral component of campaign finance law.217
In addition to affirming Buckley in Randall, the Supreme Court expressly
declined to overrule the Buckley campaign finance framework in Citizens
United.218 While the Court overturned federal laws limiting third-party
212. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 4.1(A)(8) (2011) (precluding judicial
candidates from directly soliciting campaign contributions but leaving them free to solicit
through campaign committees).
213. See Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 248 (2006) (using the Buckley framework to
determine the constitutionality of a Vermont campaign contribution limit).
214. Id.
215. See id. at 246–48 (noting that the analysis of a contribution limit must “begin with
Buckley”).
216. See id. at 262 (concluding that an act limiting campaign expenditures and
contributions “violate[s] the First Amendment as interpreted in Buckley v. Valeo” by
restricting more speech than necessary to meet the public purposes that the restrictions were
enacted to meet).
217. See McNulty, supra note 106, at 150 (arguing that Randall reaffirms Buckley as the
“binding authority for contribution and expenditure limits”).
218. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 908 (2010) (explaining that the Buckley
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independent campaign expenditures,219 it maintained the Buckley
distinction between
independent expenditures and campaign
220
contributions.
That the Court declined to overrule the Buckley
framework for analyzing campaign contributions in Citizens United is
significant. Citizens United was a landmark case in which the Court not
only struck down portions of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of
2002,221 but the Court also reversed its own precedent of allowing
restrictions on political speech based on the speaker’s corporate identity.222
Citizens United represented an upheaval of campaign finance law.223 If the
Court had wanted to overrule Buckley, Citizens United would have been the
vehicle.224
B. The Reasons for Using the Buckley Framework on Contribution
Limitations also Apply to Solicitation Bans
Even though Buckley dealt with limitations on contributions and not
solicitations, the Buckley framework is nonetheless applicable to
solicitation bans because its reasoning for using “closely drawn” scrutiny
applies to both types of restrictions. In Buckley, the Supreme Court
reasoned that “closely drawn” scrutiny is appropriate for regulations on
campaign contributions because limiting the amount of money a person can
contribute to a political cause is only a “marginal restriction upon the
contributor’s ability to engage in free communication” and because a
contributor is still “free to become a member of any political association
and to assist personally in the association’s efforts on behalf of
candidates.”225

decision “sustained limits on direct contributions” and did not extend its rationale to
independent expenditures).
219. Id. at 917.
220. Id. at 908.
221. The Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 2 and 47 U.S.C.), placed restrictions on a
myriad of campaign finance sources, including soft money and independent expenditures.
Campaign Finance Law Quick Reference for Reporters: Major Provisions of the Bipartisan
Campaign Finance Reform Act of 2002, FED. ELECTION COMM’N, http://www.fec.gov/
press/bkgnd/bcra_overview.shtml (last visited July 30, 2011).
222. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct at 917; see Adam Liptak, Justices, 5–4, Reject Corporate
Spending Limit, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22, 2010, at A1, A18 (reporting that the Citizens United
decision overruled two precedents: a 1990 decision that upheld restrictions on corporate
spending and a 2003 decision that upheld the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002).
223. See Liptak, supra note 222, at A1 (reporting that the Citizens United ruling
represented a “sharp doctrinal shift” that would have a significant impact on elections).
224. See supra notes 221–223 and accompanying text (indicating that the Citizens
United decision overruled large swaths of existing campaign finance law and thus served as
an opportunity to also overrule Buckley).
225. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 20–22 (1976) (per curiam).
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The Buckley framework should be applied to solicitation bans. Limiting
the ways that a judicial candidate can ask for money is a “marginal
restriction” on the candidate’s ability to communicate because the
candidate is still free to communicate through his or her campaign
committee.226 Furthermore, solicitation bans still leave a judicial candidate
free to associate with any group that contributes to his campaign.227 In
other words, the solicitation ban does not stop the judge or candidate from
ultimately benefiting from a contribution, just from directly asking for it.228
Therefore, for the same reasons that the Supreme Court used the Buckley
framework to analyze regulations on contributions, reviewing courts should
use the framework for regulations on solicitations for contributions.
C. Judicial Solicitation Bans Should Pass Constitutional Muster Under
the Buckley Framework
If the Buckley framework is correctly employed, the constitutionality of a
state solicitation ban should overcome a First Amendment challenge. To
satisfy the framework set forth in Buckley, the government must
demonstrate that the solicitation ban furthers “a sufficiently important
interest” and uses methods that are “closely drawn” to avoid the
unnecessary restriction of freedoms.229 Both the “sufficiently important
interest” prong and the “closely drawn” prong of this standard are fulfilled
by judicial solicitation bans.
1.

Judicial solicitation bans pass constitutional muster under Buckley
because the bans address a “sufficiently important interest”
The “sufficiently important interest” component of the Buckley standard
is easily satisfied. In Buckley, the Court specifically declared that the
state’s interest in ensuring that elected officials are not improperly

226. The ABA’s Model Code does not prohibit a judicial candidate from socializing or
visiting with any individual or group. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 4.1(A)(8)
(2011) (precluding a judicial candidate from directly soliciting contributions but leaving the
candidate free to campaign via a committee); see also Buckley, 424 U.S. at 21–22
(explaining that when a campaign restriction does not infringe on a political actor’s ability
to discuss candidates and issues, it is a “marginal restriction” on that actor’s speech rights).
227. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 4 (2011) (showing that a judicial
candidate is not precluded from socializing or visiting with any individual or group); see
also Buckley, 424 U.S. at 20–21 (indicating that if a campaign prohibition still allows a
political actor to join groups and form associations, then that prohibition is a “marginal
restriction” on the actor’s speech rights).
228. Interestingly, the Buckley Court applied similar reasoning to a campaign
contribution limitation, arguing that since a campaign contribution limitation does not
preclude contributors from assisting a campaign in another fashion, the limitation does not
severely burden the contributor’s speech rights. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 20–22.
229. Id. at 25.
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influenced by campaign contributions is extremely important.230 This state
interest set forth in Buckley is similar to the state interest set forth in
challenges to judicial solicitations bans: judicial impartiality. In the
challenges to state solicitation bans,231 a state defending its solicitation ban
usually sets forth judicial impartiality, or some synonym thereof, as a
government interest furthered by the ban.232 Interestingly, a state
solicitation ban has never been struck down under strict scrutiny because a
court failed to find merit in the government’s interest in judicial
impartiality.233 Instead, they have been struck down because reviewing
courts have found that the solicitation ban is not “narrowly tailored” to the
government interest.234 Thus, any solicitation ban—bolstered by the state’s
interest in judicial impartiality—can survive the first prong of the Buckley
standard.
2.

Judicial solicitation bans pass constitutional muster under Buckley
because the bans are “closely drawn” to a “sufficiently important
interest”
Although fulfilling the second Buckley prong is not as easy as the first,
judicial solicitation bans are “closely drawn” to the government interest of
maintaining an impartial judiciary. Clearly, the “closely drawn” scrutiny
standard is less rigorous than the “narrowly tailored” standard of strict
scrutiny, but the question is by how much.235
The Buckley opinion sheds light on the “closely drawn” standard.236 In
230. See id. at 27 (“Congress could legitimately conclude that the avoidance of the
appearance of improper influence ‘is also critical . . . if confidence in the system of
representative Government is not to be eroded to a disastrous extent.’” (quoting U.S. Civil
Serv. Comm’n v. Nat’l Ass’n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 565 (1973))).
231. See supra Part I.D.
232. See, e.g., Wersal v. Sexton, 613 F.3d 821, 833 (8th Cir. 2010) (holding that a state’s
interest in an impartial judge who lacks bias for or against either party to a proceeding is a
compelling state interest); Siefert v. Alexander, 608 F.3d 974, 989 (7th Cir. 2010) (noting
that the government interest supporting Wisconsin’s judicial solicitation ban was the
elimination of bias or the appearance of bias towards lawyers who have been personally
solicited by the judge for contributions), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 2872 (2011); Stretton v.
Disciplinary Bd., 944 F.2d 137, 146 (3d Cir. 1991) (reasoning that the State’s interest in
judicial integrity was compelling).
233. See, e.g., Carey v. Wolnitzek, 614 F.3d 189, 204 (6th Cir. 2010) (declining to
“doubt the bona fides” of the Kentucky solicitation clause as meeting the state’s compelling
interest in judicial impartiality).
234. See, e.g., id. at 207 (striking down Kentucky’s solicitation ban as not narrowly
tailored because it was “overbroad”).
235. See FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. 238, 259–60 (1986) (establishing that
the Buckley standard used to analyze the constitutionality of contribution limitations
“require[s] less compelling justification” than the strict scrutiny standard used to analyze
independent expenditure restrictions).
236. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 29 (1976) (per curiam) (discussing the factors that
should be considered when analyzing the constitutionality of a contribution limit under the
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Buckley, challengers to a $1000 contribution limit to political candidates
argued that the law was overbroad because most large contributors do not
seek to improperly influence candidates, and a contributor would need to
spend much more than $1000 to influence a candidate in his official
position.237 The Court disregarded these arguments, explaining that while
Congress could have drafted the limitation differently, the fact that
Congress chose a $1000 limit instead of a $2000 limit does not invalidate
the legislation as long as Congress deemed some sort of limit necessary.238
Simply put, under the “closely drawn” standard, the Court seems prepared
to uphold a regulation that furthers a government interest, even if the
regulation is not finely tuned to accomplish that interest.239 By reason of
implication, the Court, by not requiring “fine tuning,” suggested that under
“closely drawn” scrutiny, a regulation may be somewhat overinclusive or
underinclusive and still pass constitutional muster.240
In Randall, the Court expounded upon Buckley’s description of “closely
drawn” scrutiny.241 The Court explained that the Buckley framework
allowed contribution limitations so long as the government showed a
“sufficiently important interest,” but not if those limitations restricted
candidates from “amassing the resources necessary for effective
advocacy.”242 Randall indicated that Buckley established a balancing test
for courts reviewing contribution limitations—the court must uphold
limitations that further an important state interest but must strike down
limitations that unduly inhibit the political process.243
Under the auspices of this balancing test, the Court has refused to set a
minimum contribution threshold where any amount below such a floor
could not be regulated by the state.244 For example, in Buckley, the Court
“closely drawn” standard).
237. Id. at 29–30.
238. See id. at 30 (observing that, upon a congressional determination that a limit on
contributions is necessary, deference to the legislature is appropriate, as “a court has no
scalpel to probe, whether, say, a $2,000 ceiling might not serve as well as $1,000” (citation
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
239. See id.
240. See McNulty, supra note 106, at 176 (noting that cases applying the Buckley
framework to campaign contribution limitations only require that the limitation not be the
lowest in the nation or lower than limits the Court has previously upheld, suggesting that the
“closely drawn” standard is not a highly exacting standard).
241. See Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 247–48 (2006) (explaining that “closely
drawn” scrutiny requires the courts to determine whether contribution limits are so low that
they burden the political process).
242. Id. at 247.
243. See id. (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted) (explaining that the
$1000 contribution limitation in Buckley was constitutional because there was “no
indication” that the limitation would have “any dramatic adverse effect” on campaigning
(citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
244. See, e.g., Buckley, 424 U.S. at 21 (discussing the contours of a constitutionally
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decided that a $1000 contribution limit was constitutional because it
discerned “no indication” that the limit would seriously negatively impact
funding a campaign.245 But in Randall, the Court struck down limitations
that capped donations at $400, $300, or $200 for various state offices
because the limits imposed serious restrictions on the ability of state
candidates and political parties to wage effective campaigns.246
Reviewing courts have commonly held that judicial solicitation bans fail
strict scrutiny because they are not “narrowly tailored” to the state’s
interest in impartiality.247 These courts have either declared state judicial
solicitation bans to be not inclusive enough or overreaching.248
Although the solicitation ban would not likely be narrowly tailored under
strict scrutiny, depending on which circuit is asked, the judicial solicitation
ban passes muster under the less exacting Buckley framework. First, the
Buckley framework does not require that the ban be “finely tuned” to the
state’s interest. Therefore, while the Eleventh and Sixth Circuits in Weaver
and Carey were right in noting that the solicitation ban is both
underinclusive in that it cannot completely prevent judicial candidates from
learning the identity of their campaign contributors, and overinclusive in
that the ban applies to candidate activities that do not compromise judicial
integrity, these considerations are less important under the Buckley
framework than under strict scrutiny. In fact, Buckley does not seem to
indicate that any degree of overinclusiveness or underinclusiveness is
constitutionally problematic under “closely drawn” scrutiny so long as the
state does not regulate to the point that campaign activity is stifled.249
The judicial solicitation ban, as provided by the Model Code, passes the
acceptable contribution limitation without specifying a dollar amount under which a
limitation would be unconstitutional).
245. Id.
246. Randall, 548 U.S. at 238, 253.
247. See, e.g., Republican Party of Minn. v. White (White II), 416 F.3d 738, 765–66 (8th
Cir. 2005) (en banc) (holding that Minnesota’s solicitation ban was not narrowly tailored
because there were less restrictive ways to meet the state’s interest); Weaver v. Bonner, 309
F.3d 1312, 1322 (11th Cir. 2002) (holding that Georgia’s solicitation ban was not narrowly
tailored because the ban did not completely prevent judicial candidates from being
influenced through contributions).
248. See, e.g., Carey v. Wolnitzek, 614 F.3d 189, 205 (6th Cir. 2010) (striking down
Kentucky’s solicitation ban as overbroad because the ban prohibited a wide spectrum of
solicitation, such as speeches and mass mailings, that did not pose the threat of “undue
pressure or . . . quid pro quo” that the state sought to guard against); White II, 416 F.3d at
765 (concluding that the judicial solicitation ban proscribed more speech than necessary to
meet the state’s interest in impartiality); Weaver, 309 F.3d at 1322 (holding that the judicial
solicitation ban did not adequately address the state’s interest in judicial impartiality since
candidates could still solicit though committees).
249. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 22 (indicating that contribution limitations are
constitutionally sound as long as campaigns and political committees are still able to gather
the resources needed to campaign effectively).

GHOSH.OFF.TO.PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE)

10/3/2011 9:10 AM

158

[Vol. 61:125

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

balancing test established in Buckley because the prohibition does not
preclude judicial candidates from fundraising—candidates are able to use
campaign committees to solicit on their behalf.250 Furthermore, judicial
candidates are not prevented from accepting contributions through their
committees.251 While judicial solicitation bans alter the method of judicial
fundraising, they stop short of crippling the campaign effort; this is
illustrated by the drastic increase in the cost of judicial campaigns over the
past decade,252 despite the widespread imposition of judicial solicitation
bans.253
IV. THE PROBLEM OF SOLICITING VERSUS THE PROBLEM OF NOT
SOLICITING
Challenges to the constitutionality of the judicial code of conduct are
Given that the
regularly appealed to the Supreme Court.254
constitutionality of judicial solicitation bans has caused a split between the
Sixth and Seventh Circuits in just the past year,255 it is not outlandish to
assume that the Supreme Court might hear another case involving judicial
codes of conduct in the near future. Such a grant of certiorari may very
well include a solicitation ban challenge.256 The Supreme Court has shown
some signs that it will not automatically use strict scrutiny to analyze
solicitation bans, so the outcome of such a challenge is unknown.257
If the Supreme Court does hear a challenge to a judicial solicitation ban
and establishes the Buckley framework as the appropriate method of

250. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 4.1(A)(8) (2011).
251. See id. (authorizing certain contribution solicitations by a campaign committee, but
barring the judicial candidate’s personal intervention in such solicitations).
252. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
253. See Methods of Judicial Selection, supra note 29 (showing that thirty-two states
have adopted a form of the model solicitation ban by statute or judicial canon).
254. See, e.g., Spargo v. N.Y. State Comm’n on Judicial Conduct, 351 F.3d 65 (2d Cir.
2003) (deciding a challenge to three New York judicial codes of conduct), cert. denied, 541
U.S. 1085 (2004); In re Kinsey, 842 So. 2d 77 (Fla. 2003) (per curiam) (rendering judgment
on a challenge to a judicial canon that prohibited judicial candidates from making
statements that appeared to commit the candidate to a particular side of a contested issue),
cert. denied sub. nom. Kinsey v. Fla. Judicial Qualifications Comm’n, 540 U.S. 825 (2003).
255. Compare Carey v. Wolnitzek, 614 F.3d 189, 207 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding that the
judicial solicitation ban fails a strict scrutiny analysis because it is not narrowly tailored to a
compelling government interest), with Siefiert v. Alexander, 608 F.3d 974, 990 (7th Cir.
2010) (concluding that the judicial solicitation ban passes constitutional muster under the
Buckley framework because it is “closely drawn” to an important government interest), cert.
denied, 131 S. Ct. 2872 (2011).
256. The Supreme Court recently denied a writ of certiorari for a case involving a First
Amendment challenge to a state judicial solicitation ban. Siefert v. Alexander, 131 S. Ct.
2872 (2011). However, it is possible that the Court may hear a similar case in the near
future.
257. See supra Part II.
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analysis for the ban, then the widely enacted state solicitation bans would
likely be upheld against First Amendment challenges.258 Thus, in states
that have enacted the solicitation ban, judges and judicial candidates would
continue to be prohibited from directly asking lawyers, business interests,
lobbyists, or unions for money.259 Direct solicitations are an effective way
to fundraise; therefore, without this tactic, it may become more difficult for
judges and judicial candidates to raise money to campaign.260 For those
concerned primarily with the cost of campaign contributions on judicial
impartiality, this may seem like a positive outcome.
However, as demonstrated by the 2010 retention election in Iowa,
elected judges can and do become targets of campaigns to oust them based
on unpopular decisions.261 Furthermore, the Supreme Court significantly
increased the spending power of corporations that might wish to unseat a
judge or defeat a candidate.262 The result of the Supreme Court’s decision
in Citizens United to invalidate prohibitions on independent corporate
expenditures was to remove any floodgate that existed between the funds of
corporations and political campaigns.263 Essentially, the decision made it
possible for groups with a lot of money to spend that money against
judicial candidates who rule in a way that these groups do not like.264
It would be absurd to think that elected judges and judicial candidates do
not take note of the fates of their colleagues who have become targets of
organized efforts to defeat them.265 This is especially true since judges
themselves have spoken out about the importance of money in a judicial
258. See supra Part III.C (positing that state solicitation bans pass constitutional muster
under the Buckley framework).
259. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 4.1(A)(8) (2011) (providing a model
prohibition preventing judicial candidates from directly soliciting contributions from any
source).
260. See, e.g., Stretton v. Disciplinary Bd., 944 F.2d 137, 146 (3d Cir. 1991) (describing
and rejecting the appellant’s contention that direct solicitation “is the most effective means
for raising money” and that the state’s ban constituted undue interference with the
candidate’s engagement in the political process).
261. See Sulzberger, supra note 7 (recounting “an unusually aggressive ouster
campaign” in a state judicial retention election that resulted in three justices losing office).
262. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 913 (2010) (striking down limits on thirdparty independent expenditures made by corporations).
263. See id. at 968 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“At a time when concerns about the conduct
of judicial elections have reached a fever pitch . . . the Court today unleashes the floodgates
of corporate and union general treasury spending in these races.”).
264. See SKAGGS, supra note 14, at 2 (“Special interest spending has occurred in judicial
elections despite the fact that approximately half the states previously banned or sharply
restricted corporations from using treasury funds for campaign advocacy. None of these
restrictions [are] permissible after Citizens United. The inevitable result will be increased
corporate spending in judicial elections . . . .”).
265. See Brief of the Conference of Chief Justices as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Neither Party at 9, Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252 (2009) (No. 08-22)
(discussing the strains that expensive judicial campaigns have placed on judicial behavior).
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election. Wallace Jefferson, Chief Justice of the Texas Supreme Court,
stated that “[i]n a close race, the judge who solicits the most money from
lawyers and their clients has the upper hand.”266 If judges themselves are
talking about the influences associated with campaign contributions, then it
is quite clear that judges faced with a controversial decision may find
themselves influenced by their contributors.
Prohibiting judges and judicial candidates from directly soliciting
campaign funds—an effective fundraising method—leaves these judges
and candidates vulnerable to interests that seek to punish them for making
an unpopular decision.267 Moreover, prohibiting judges and judicial
candidates from directly soliciting campaign funds from all potential
contributors makes them reliant on the interests with the cash to fund
campaigns, including interests with specific viewpoints on legal issues.268
Therefore, the irony of the situation is that prohibiting judges and judicial
candidates from directly soliciting funds is a threat to judicial impartiality
while allowing judges and judicial candidates to directly solicit is also a
threat to judicial impartiality.
Over the years, two solutions have been circulated to address this
paradox: recusal requirements269 and widespread judicial appointments
instead of elections.270 Recusal, in the judicial context, means to disqualify
oneself from a particular case because of a conflict of interest.271 Fortyseven states have enacted the recusal rule272 promulgated by the Model
Code of Judicial Conduct.273 However, commentators argue that recusal is
“underused” and “underenforced” for three main reasons274: first, motions
for disqualification are expensive and uncertain;275 second, judges
typically decide for themselves whether to grant motions for
266. SAMPLE ET AL., supra note 31, at 12 (internal quotation marks omitted).
267. See Sulzberger, supra note 7 (reporting a trend where judges who have issued
controversial opinions have become targets of ouster campaigns).
268. Cf. SKAGGS, supra note 14, at 7 fig. 3 (demonstrating that contributions from
lawyers and lobbyists, unarguably entities with a stake in the outcome of court cases,
accounted for over half of all judicial campaign contributions between 2000 and 2009).
269. See JAMES SAMPLE ET AL., FAIR COURTS: SETTING RECUSAL STANDARDS 16 (2008)
(explaining that, in recent years, legal scholars and the ABA have debated recusal rules and
that courts and legislatures are expected to take up the issue next).
270. See, e.g., Andrew Cohen, The Case Against Judicial Elections: Keep Politics Out
of the Law, POLITICS DAILY (June 6, 2010), http://www.politicsdaily.com/2010/06/06/thecase-against-judicial-elections-keep-politics-out-of-the-la/ (arguing that judges should be
selected by a committee and subsequently appointed, not elected).
271. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1390 (9th ed. 2009).
272. SAMPLE ET AL., supra note 269, at 17.
273. The recusal rule reads: “A judge shall disqualify himself or herself in a proceeding
in which the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned . . . .” MODEL CODE OF
JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.11(A) (2011).
274. SAMPLE ET AL., supra note 269, at 20.
275. Id.
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disqualification against them;276 and finally, bias tends to be unconscious
and therefore bias can go unnoticed or be underestimated.277
Moreover, the nation’s judicial system is already overburdened.278 If
recusal rates spike, it would only serve to overtax an already burdened
system.279 Since recusal runs the risk of being “underused” and
“underenforced,” and threatens an already overburdened judicial system,
recusal requirements are not a viable solution to the problems associated
with judicial fundraising.
A second solution is to eliminate judicial elections. As expressed by
courts that have struck down solicitation bans, the root risks to judicial
impartiality stem from the state decision to choose judges through popular
election.280 As the Sixth Circuit acknowledged, “[j]udicial elections, like
most elections, require money—often a lot of it.”281 Simply put, the
existence of judicial elections creates the need for judicial fundraising,
which creates serious risks to the impartiality of the judiciary.282
Aside from the negative aspects of judicial campaigning, commentators
have pointed out other serious problems with electing the judiciary.
Although a large majority of the electorate favors electing judges, a large
majority of the electorate also does not vote in judicial elections.283
Moreover, a majority of the electorate does not even know the judicial
candidates in their jurisdictions.284
Recently, a coalition of judges, politicians, and lawyers, led by former

276. Id.
277. Id.
278. See, e.g., Anna Gorman, Too Many Cases, Too Few Judges, L.A. TIMES, July 21,
2008, at B1, B7 (reporting that the caseload at the Los Angeles Immigration Court has risen
substantially in recent years but the number of judges has stayed the same, causing delays);
Finis Williams, With Too Few Judges, Civil Cases Languish, CONCORD MONITOR, Jan. 27,
2009, http://www.concordmonitor.com/article/with-too-few-judges-civil-cases-languish
(lamenting that there are not enough judges in Nashua, New Hampshire to deal with the
civil case load at the Hillsborough County Superior Court).
279. See, e.g., Carrie Johnson, Judge Recusals May Hinder Gulf Oil Spill Lawsuits, NPR
(June 8, 2010), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyID=
127560878&ft=1&f=127560878 (reporting that so many judges recused themselves due to
conflicts of interest that the litigation has been seriously delayed).
280. See Carey v. Wolnitzek, 614 F.3d 189, 204 (6th Cir. 2010) (“Preserving these
interests [in judicial legitimacy and integrity], we also acknowledge, grows more
complicated when a State exercises its sovereign right to select judges through popular
elections.”).
281. Id.
282. See supra Part I.A (discussing the escalating costs of judicial elections and the
corresponding drop in public opinion regarding the integrity of the judiciary).
283. See Charles Gardner Geyh, Why Judicial Elections Stink, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 43, 53
(2003) (observing that about eighty percent of the electorate does not vote in judicial
elections).
284. See id. at 54 (noting that approximately eighty percent of the electorate is unaware
of the judicial candidates running for office in their jurisdiction).
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Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, have begun a campaign to
eliminate judicial elections and implement systems that seat judges based
on merit.285 The coalition intends to lobby state lawmakers to implement a
merit system, which typically involves a selection commission that
nominates a candidate for judicial appointment and retention elections.286
While the merit system still includes some voter input through retention
elections, it takes much of the politics out of the appointment of new
judges. For example, a powerful interest could organize to oust a judge
during a retention election, but it could do little to ensure that the judge’s
replacement favored the interest’s views.287 Furthermore, by eliminating
general elections, the merit system does away with much of the need for
campaign contributions. By selecting judges through a commission,
judicial candidates have no need to collect contributions to run ads, send
out mailers, and participate in other campaign activities.288 If this nation
takes the ideal of an impartial and independent judiciary seriously,
suggestions to replace the failing judicial election system must also be
taken seriously.
CONCLUSION
Over the last decade, millions upon millions of dollars have been spent
in state judicial elections,289 primarily by contributors with an interest in the
outcome of litigation.290 Spending large sums of money on judicial
elections is not a new phenomenon, but following the Supreme Court’s
Citizens United decision, the amount spent in these elections will likely
increase.291 Given reported cases of judicial impropriety and public
opinion polls indicating a loss of faith in the judiciary, campaign
contributions to judges (and candidates) have already taken a toll on the
sanctity of the nation’s judicial system. Logically, it can be expected that if

285. John Schwartz, Effort Begun to Abolish the Election of Judges, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
24, 2009, at A12.
286. Id.
287. See id. (describing the merit-based selection system for judges, which is comprised
of a commission that nominates judicial candidates, as opposed to the selection of judges by
election); Sulzberger, supra note 7 (describing campaigns organized during the 2010
election cycle to oust unpopular judges standing for retention elections).
288. See Schwartz, supra note 285, at A12 (explaining that the merit-based judicial
selection system involves a nomination from a selection commission and appointment by
the state’s governor, thus negating the need for an electoral campaign).
289. See SAMPLE ET AL., supra note 31, at 5–8 (explaining that nationally, between 2000
and 2009, state supreme court candidates raised $206.9 million).
290. Id. at 9.
291. See Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 968 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(arguing that the Citizens United decision “unleashes the floodgates of corporate and union
general treasury spending in [election] races”).
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judicial campaign contributions continue to increase, the damage to the
judicial system will grow as well.
While judicial solicitation bans are not a comprehensive solution to the
problems associated with judicial campaign contributions,292 the bans serve
as a safeguard against unchecked judicial quid pro quo and the appearance
of judicial quid pro quo. Until our country stamps out the root risks to
judicial impartiality and independence that stem from judicial elections,
upholding the bans—perhaps by analyzing them under the Buckley
framework—is an important step toward ensuring that court cases are not
won by the parties with the deepest pockets.

292. See Weaver v. Bonner, 309 F.3d 1312, 1323 (11th Cir. 2002) (acknowledging that
solicitation bans cannot completely guard judicial impartiality because “[s]uccessful
candidates will feel beholden to the people who helped them get elected regardless of who
did the soliciting of support”).

